A common belief is that individual investors are noise traders that distort stock prices. Because accurate share prices are important for economic functioning, the market effect of retail investors has significant regulatory implications. This paper, employing a new NYSE retail trading data set and the R 2 metric of share price informedness, contributes to the debate by demonstrating that as the proportion of trading by individual investors increases, the R 2 of firms decreases. Adherents of the R 2 methodology hold that lower R 2 's imply more accurate stock prices. The results of an instrumental variable estimation suggest that this relationship is a causal one (that is, retail trading causes changes in R 2 ). Thus, if a low R 2 indeed signifies share price accuracy, the findings of this study provide evidence that, contrary to the received wisdom, retail trading increases share price accuracy.
"…[T]he more emotions and cognitive biases of noise traders adversely affect market prices, the more noise traders can be construed as "bad guys." Good public policy would then be to eradicate these biases if possible, or at least neutralize their social and economic influence… [T] his is the deep concern about where the behavioral literature leads us: if accurate, it invites regulation that privileges the savvy and treats unsophisticated traders as economic undesirables."
This Article provides evidence on the effect of individual investors on share price accuracy. My examination of a new data set of New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") retail trading statistics shows that retail investor trading levels are significantly correlated with firm-specific stock return variation (also known as R 2 ), a commonly used measure of share price accuracy. Though there is controversy surrounding the correct interpretation of this metric, the dominant view among R 2 adherents is the greater a stock's firm-specific return variation (that is, the lower the R 2 ), the more accurate its price. The evidence in this study shows not only that increased levels of retail trading are associated with lower R 2'
s, but also that there is reason to believe the relationship is a causal one (that is, retail trading causes changes in R 2 ). Though the implications of these findings depend on the proper interpretation of R 2 , the evidence suggests that retail investors have a positive effect on share price accuracy and that restricting the access of large numbers of individual investors to equity markets is not only unwarranted, but also could harm market functioning.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature surrounding noise trading and individual investors in an attempt to provide some context for the debate. Section 3 describes the R 2 methodology, and Section 4 describes the data used and analytical methodologies of this study.
Section 4 also presents preliminary results. Section 5 concludes and briefly considers the policy implications of this study's findings.
Review of Existing Literature
The effects of irrational or noise traders on stock prices and market efficiency is a central issue in finance scholarship. The traditional belief is that irrational traders cannot affect share prices over the long run. Under this theory, trading based on mistaken beliefs will lead to trading losses against rational, informed investors and wealth reductions that will make it impossible for irrational traders to survive in a competitive marketplace (see, for example, Friedman 1953; Fama 1965) . Trades of irrational traders are random and uncorrelated, thus tending to cancel one another out and largely eliminating any price effects from such trading (see, for example , Friedman 1953; Fama 1965) . Therefore, as the theory goes, there is little reason to worry about the presence of noise traders.
This traditional view has come under intense theoretical and empirical attack. 5 In a theoretical study, Kogan et al. (2006) conclude that irrational traders can have a persistent effect on stock prices even if they do not "survive" (that is, the value of their trades is infinitesimal in relation to the total value of trades because they have suffered wealth reductions). In addition, a large body of empirical analysis provides evidence that the trades of irrational investors are not random and do not cancel one another out.
This evidence suggests that noise traders often act as a herd (see Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003] and Lux [1995] for a review of the literature related to herding behavior). Thus, in the opinion of many in the finance and legal academies, noise trader risk is real, and protecting market efficiency requires creating a climate that can counteract the effects of noise traders (see, for example, Goshen and Parchomovsky 2006; Langevoort 2002) . 6 Most prior research shows that individual investors are more likely to make irrational or imprudent investment decisions than institutional investors are (Jackson 2003) . Barber, Odean and Zhu (2005) find that small trades (serving as a proxy for trades by individual investors) are correlated, buying by retail investors pushes prices too high (above their fundamental values), and selling by retail investors 5 As noted by Kogan et al. (2006, 195-96) , De Long et al. (1990) argue, on the basis of a partial equilibrium model, that irrational traders hold portfolios with high growth and can potentially outgrow rational traders and thus survive. Conversely, Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2001) , using general equilibrium models, conclude "irrational traders do not survive in the long run." 6 However, see Section 5 for a discussion of the work of scholars that suggests that noise traders can enhance market functioning.
pushes prices too low (below their fundamental values). They conclude that individual investors (whom they term noise traders) can move equity markets. Similarly, Hvidkjaer (2006) , using trade size as a proxy for the trades of individual investors, conducts a study on individual investor trading patterns and concludes that there is a systematic component to retail trading and that such trading behavior can lead to or protract periods where a stock is over-or undervalued. Kumar and Lee (2006) also find that retail investor trades are systematically correlated, that this concerted action can affect stock returns and that this "retail sentiment" does not appear to be an outgrowth of a reaction to factors related to fundamental value.
But evidence from international markets calls into question the idea that retail investors are the noise traders in markets. Jackson (2003) , after analyzing a unique dataset of 41.9 million retail investor trades over an 11-year period on the Australian Stock Exchange, 7 finds that, though individuals invest in a systematic fashion, it would not be appropriate to characterize their trading behavior as "irrational."
Indeed, the trades of individuals investing through full-service brokerage firms positively predict future market returns. 8 Jackson states that one potential reason for this result could be individuals' possession of valuable private information.
In addition, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) , based on a study of two years (1996) (1997) (1998) 9 of Korea Stock Exchange trading data, find that domestic retail investors 10 possess a short-lived informational advantage over both foreign investors and domestic institutional investors. An event study on trading behavior of different classes of investors around days on which stock prices have a 5% or more, in 7 According to Jackson, as of 2001, the U.S. market is 37 times as large as the Australian market (as measured by total market capitalization). Also, in the U.S. retail investors own approximately 42% of the stock traded on U.S. markets. In Australia, the percentage of individual investor ownership is 24%. The U.S. and Australian markets are not strictly comparable, but Australia is one of the few markets in the world with sizable retail investor participation. Thus, Jackson's study results should be interesting to those concerned about the effect of individuals on market functioning. 8 Jackson examines trades from individuals that invest through 47 full-service brokerage firms and 9 Internet brokers. Jackson reports that the trades of the full-service brokerage clients drive the study's results. 9 The Asian crisis of the late 1990's and its market effects during the study period may affect the researchers' findings and make the results ungeneralizable. 10 Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) report that, at the time of the study, domestic retail investors were the most active traders on the Korea Stock Exchange, with their sales representing 77.4% of the gross value of stock sales in 1998. This is a much higher proportion of retail investor trading than in the United States. given the small size, could actually be a portion of a trade made by an institutional investor.
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In addition, odd-lot trading data have a strong potential for underinclusiveness with respect to retail trading.
Though any investor may trade in odd lots, a common belief is that individual investors of lower wealth are more apt to do so. Using odd-lot trading as a proxy for the individual investor trading is problematic, however, because many individual investors trade in round lots; indeed, there is evidence that they prefer 11 The database on which Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) rely does not distinguish between public market individual investors and company insiders. Insiders, of course, may avail themselves of non-public information before trading, which, of course, would make it appear as though they can predict corporate events. 12 Barber, Odean and Zhu (2005) recognize the limitations of small share size as a proxy for individual investor trading and do some limited testing of their data against actual brokerage firm data to gain comfort in the representativeness of their data sets. 13 Odd-lot trading is trading a number of shares other than that which is required for a round lot (100 shares). Wu (1972) , in a study of individual investor trading behavior that used odd-lot trading data as a proxy for the trades of such investors, concludes that odd-lot trading has no effect on share prices. For an example of a recent work using odd-lot trading data as a proxy for retail investor trading, see Brusa, Liu and Schulman (2005) . 14 Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) , in a study of retail investor behavior, use a proprietary data set of NYSE trades provided to the researchers directly by the NYSE. They find that retail investor trades tend to follow certain patterns, but that there is no strong evidence that the trades of individuals are correlated. Though their findings are relevant to the ongoing debate, they do not provide evidence that directly addresses the question of whether individual investors affect share price accuracy. 15 Indeed, the average size of a market trade today is 260 shares, down from 1,400 shares a decade ago (Patterson and Lucchetti 2008) .
to do so. 16 Use of odd-lot data loses the impact of round-lot trading in study results. This study's second contribution to the literature is its examination of a relationship that has not yet been studied --the relationship between retail trading activity and R 2 .
R 2
In this study, I use "R 2 " as a measure of share price accuracy. "R 2 " is the R 2 statistic obtained by regressing the individual returns of a firm's stock on the returns of the market as a whole and the firm's industry group (excluding the firm in question). In statistics, R 2 tells how much of the variation (expressed as a percentage) observed in a dependent variable (in this case, a firm's individual stock return) is explained 17 by the independent or explanatory variables (in this case, the market return and the industry return). R 2 takes the value of 0.0 -1.0, with an R 2 of 0.0 signifying that none of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by its relationship with the independent variables. Conversely, an R 2 of 1.0 means that 100% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by its relationship with the independent variables.
In this study, a high R 2 means that much of the variation in an individual firm's stock returns can be explained by the market return and the industry return. In other words, the firm's stock price is influenced primarily by movements in the market as a whole and stocks in the firm's industry group.
Conversely, a low R 2 means that a firm's stock price movements bear little relation to movements in market prices or stock prices of its industry peers. There are two potential explanations for this occurrence: 1) Low R 2 means that the firm's stock price is more "informationally efficient" because it incorporates firm-specific (rather than market or industry) information and is therefore more "accurate" or 2) Low R 2 means the firm's stock price reflects significant non-market or industry information, but such information is noise, rather than information related to a company's fundamentals (Roll 1988 ).
18
In current finance scholarship, among R 2 metric adherents, 19 the former view prevails, but is controversial. Resolving the R 2 controversy is important for interpreting the finding of this study and others that rely on the R 2 methodology. What follows is a review of R 2 -related studies. A number of prior studies suggest that R 2 is consistent with greater share price accuracy, but several researchers have found evidence that leads them to reach the opposite conclusion. Recent work by Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) provides a path for reconciling the competing interpretations of R 2 , and, as I describe in Section 5, the instant study provides evidence consistent with their theory.
Available evidence that a low R 2 is a metric of informational efficiency and share price accuracy is strong. Durnev et al. (2003) provide the most direct evidence on this question as they compare firmspecific stock return variation (R 2 ) and accounting-based measures of stock price informativeness. They define stock price informativeness as the measure of how much information stock prices contain about future earnings, estimated from a regression of then-current stock returns on current and future accounting earnings. Durnev et al. (2003) find that firm-specific variability (a lower R 2 ) is positively correlated with their measures of stock price informativeness and conclude that low R 2 is indeed a sign of share price accuracy and not noise impounded in share prices.
In addition, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2001) find that firms operating in U.S. industries with lower R 2 's use more external financing. The authors suggest that this relationship is evidence that low R 2 is associated with stock prices that more closely track firm fundamentals. In another study, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find a strong correlation between firm-specific return variation and 18 Of course, a low R 2 also could mean that a firm's stock price moves largely independently of the market and its industry group and that the information compounded in its stock price is a combination of fundamental information and noise. This explanation is quite plausible, but, as described in this section, researchers have provided evidence on whether one or the other explanation is more likely, rather than a little of both. 19 One may argue that R 2 is very similar to beta. A high beta indicates that a stock's returns closely track the returns of the overall market. Under asset pricing theory, both high beta and low beta stocks operate in an environment that is assumed to be fully informed. Thus, some may be skeptical of the claim that the R 2 is a measure of share price accuracy. However, I proceed under the assumption that the level of R 2 reflects informational efficiency because this interpretation has been used extensively in recent finance scholarship. economically efficient corporate investment. They suggest that capital investment should be more efficient when stock prices are more informative because accurate prices give signals to both management and financial market participants about the quality of management's investment decisions. Presumably, managers may use this signal to change course when necessary, and investors, as Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) suggest, may use this signal to intervene as necessary in the face of poor management decisions. Similarly, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) The five countries with firms having the lowest average levels of firm-specific variation (highest R 2 's) are, in order, Poland, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Turkey. Overall, and with few exceptions, firms in low-income economies (measured by per capita GDP) have, on average, the highest R 2 's. This evidence is consistent with the intuition that firms in more well developed economies have more accurate share prices. Similarly, researchers find that lower average firm R 2 's are associated with more efficient capital allocation in a country (Wurgler 2000) and less country-level opaqueness 20 (Jin and Myers 2006) .
The R 2 methodology also has found adherents among the ranks of legal scholars. For example, Fox, Morck, Yeung and Durnev (2003) conclude that enhanced mandatory disclosure rules adopted in the 20 Jin and Myers (2006, 281) Chan and Hameed (2006) compare stock price synchronicity and research analyst activity in emerging markets and find that greater coverage by research analysts is associated with more stock price synchronicity in the market (lower firm-specific information in prices or higher R 2 's).
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Based on these results, Chan and Hameed (2006) conclude that the conventional wisdom that research analysts produce firm-specific information is incorrect and that what analysts actually produce is market-wide information. Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006) , however, point to this result as evidence that the R 2 metric is not a measure of informational efficiency because one expects analysts to produce firm-specific information.
The work of Veldkamp (2006) may help bridge the gap between these two opposing conclusions. Veldkamp (2006, 823) s of OTC stocks were lower, on average, than those of listed stocks. Ferrell states that it is "highly implausible" that the OTC market was more informationally efficient than the listed market before the 1964 amendments.
Ferrell likely finds this outcome implausible because of the limited disclosure from OTC market firms before the amendments. Ferrell reports that, in 1963, the Securities and Exchange Commission 22 The researchers consider price momentum in a stock an outcome of investor overreaction. Price momentum, a sign of informational inefficiency, is defined in their study as the presence of a phenomenon by which an investor could buy the "winning" stocks and short sell the "losing" stocks from a prior six-month period and generate economically and statistically significant trading profits over the next one to six months.
(SEC) completed a report on the state of securities regulation. In its report, the SEC found that, of a random sample comprising approximately 20% of all OTC companies, 25% of the firms did not supply any financial data to their shareholders at all, and 23% did not certify their financial statements. Of those firms that did provide financial data to their stockholders, 44% did not categorize their inventories, and 33% failed to provide explanatory notes on significant financial matters, including depreciation methods, long-term contractual obligations and contingent liabilities, all of which firms with listed stocks were required to disclose.
As demonstrated above, the prevailing view in the literature among R 2 adherents is that R 2 is a measure of price informativeness, but that view is controversial. Lee and Liu (2007) attempt to reconcile the two competing interpretations of R 2 . They hypothesize that the relationship between R 2 and share price informativeness is not monotonic, but rather U-shaped. They thus argue that when there is more firm-specific return variation in stocks that operate in good information environments, 23 lower R 2'
s are a sign of more price informedness. Conversely, for firms that operate in poor information environments, higher R 2 's are a sign of more accurate prices. 24 The idea is that if a firm operates in a good environment for information, then having more of the firm-specific variety will enhance share price accuracy. 25 Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) also set forth a theory that is highly persuasive in reconciling the competing views on R 2 . The researchers argue that the R 2 metric must be put into context vis-à-vis a firm's transparency before the period over which R 2 is calculated. For example, consider, the researchers urge, the extreme case of Firm ABC that is "completely transparent" as of December 31, 2006 (that is, there is no firm-specific information about Firm ABC that is unknown to public market investors as of 23 Lee and Liu define a good information environment for a firm as one characterized by (1) higher institutional ownership, (2) longer time in existence, (3) lower research analyst forecast dispersion, (4) lower research analyst forecast error, (5) higher liquidity (greater ease of selling without affecting price) and (6) a lower probability that a market maker in a stock will trade with an informed trader (because most firm-specific information is already incorporated into the price). The last characteristic is derived from a market microstructure model first set forth by Easley, Hvidkjaer, O'Hara (2005) . Interpreting lower values of this metric as a sign of greater price informativeness is controversial (see Lee and Liu 2007) . 24 The researchers rely on the information environment rather than the metric of informativeness used by (that is, how well the price predicts future earnings) because of data availability and tractability given their research design. 25 See Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2006) for evidence that calls into question certain elements of Lee and Liu's (2007) theory of the U-shaped relationship between price informativeness and idiosyncratic volatility.
that date). In this case, investors would have incorporated perfectly firm-specific data into the thencurrent price. If researchers were to regress the returns of Firm ABC on the market's return, say, for example, from January 1 -December 31, 2007, they likely would find, according to the account of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) , that the regression would yield an R 2 of 1.0. The authors argue that as firm-specific events unfold during 2007, the firm's stock price would not move after these events because the market already would have anticipated the occurrence of such events (that is, there is no "surprise").
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The only area of uncertainty with respect to the appropriate price for Firm ABC's stock is the effect of market-wide events on Firm ABC, which would explain the perfect comovement with the market return.
Conversely, a firm that is "completely opaque" on December 31, 2006, likely would have a low R 2 for the January 1 -December 31, 2007 period. Thus, the researchers posit that firms that operate in better information environments are likely to have higher return synchronicity with the market. 
Data Sources, Sample, Methodology and Results of Analysis

Data and Sample
The period of this study is April 1 This analysis assumes, of course, that the market would be able to incorporate the information into the price accurately. 27 Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) also find empirical support for their theoretical assertions. They find that older firms have higher R 2 's, and that stock return synchronicity becomes significantly higher following equity issuancerelated disclosures. 28 See Section 4.3 for a description of the accounting data used in this study. 29 Retail trading data for April 21, 2006 are unavailable and, thus, are not a part of the sample. However, because there is no reason to believe that retail trading behavior differed significantly on that date from other dates in the sample, this omission should not bias the overall conclusions of this Article. 30 Though this figure does not represent all trading by retail investors in NYSE-listed stocks (only that executed on the NYSE), the study data should capture the overwhelming majority of the retail trading activity in NYSE-listed stocks. Researchers estimate that between 75% and 85% of trading volume of NYSE-listed stocks is executed on To construct a sample, I began with every NYSE-listed common stock 32 in the CRSP database during the study period. 33 I then eliminated from the sample any company that lacked data for the variables used in the study and all firms in industry groups with fewer than three members. 34 My final sample for this study consists of 1,129 different stocks. For all analyses, I report results derived from the overall sample, as well as results derived after splitting the sample into two approximately equal groups of 565 and 564 different stocks based on size (as determined by average market capitalization during the study period). I refer to these groups as "Top Half" (the larger firms) and "Bottom Half" (the smaller firms).
the NYSE (see, for example, Goldstein et al. 2006) . There is no reason to believe that retail trades executed on the NYSE do not represent a similar proportion of overall retail trading activity in NYSE-listed shares. 31 The NYSE generates ReTrac figures from information accompanying orders. Every order executed on the NYSE must have an account-type designation (see ReTracEOD Data Discussion Board 2006; New York Stock Exchange 2004, 29) . ReTrac EOD files track retail investor trades (defined as those made by accounts with the designation "I" (non-program trading, individual investor, as defined in NYSE Rule 80A)). NYSE Rule 80A offers the following definition: "'Account of an individual investor' means an account covered by Section 11(a)(1)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Exchange Act Section 11(a)(1)(E) covers the following accounts: "… the account of a natural person, the estate of a natural person, or a trust (other than an investment company) created by a natural person for himself or another natural person." It is possible for brokers to execute individual investor trades along with institutional investor orders (and without the "I" designation), which could result in information from such retail trades not being included in the ReTrac data. However, this occurrence generally is believed to be rare. 32 Stocks include those classified by CRSP as "ordinary common shares" of share codes 10 (companies that have not been further defined), 11 (companies that need no further definition), 12 (companies incorporated outside the U.S.) and 18 (REITs). 33 Firms that fail to trade on any day during the study period are excluded. When a firm does not trade on a particular day, CRSP gives its daily return a value of "0." Including these firms in the sample would distort the R 2 calculation because the "0" value is not a reflection of investors' collective decision to keep the stock at the same price after a day of trading, but rather the result of no trading activity at all. 34 I cannot calculate R 2 for firms operating in industries with fewer than three members because I cannot construct an "industry group" of two or more firms for use in the calculation.
Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation
As a measure of share price informedness or accuracy, I use firm-specific stock return variation.
Following the model of Durnev et al. (2003) and others, I obtain firm-specific stock return variation (R  2 ) by use of the following regression: correct, the lower the value of R 2 generated from the above regression, the more firm-specific information there is incorporated into a firm's stock price and the more accurate the price.
Empirical Methodology and Results of Analysis
My objective is to examine the relationship between firm-specific stock return variation and retail trading activity. Consistent with the practice in the R 2 literature, I use the logistic transformation 36 of R 2 , New R 2 , as my dependent variable. 37 I obtain New R 2 by using the following formula:
In the regressions that follow, my independent variable of interest is retail trading. (See Table 1 for descriptive statistics for this study.) I define retail trading activity as the proportion of the trading in a firm's common stock that is executed by retail investors. I calculate two measures of retail trading activity in this study: 1) the ratio of the number of shares of a firm's stock bought by retail investors each trading day in the study period to the total number of a firm's shares traded each day in the study period, 35 Consistent with Durnev et al. (2003) , I exclude the firm in question to avoid spurious correlations between firm returns and industry returns for companies in industries with only a few firms. 36 This is a common econometric remedy (see, for example, Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000) . The transformed variable is a continuous variable that is more normally distributed than R 2 , which has values between 0 and 1 (AshbaughSkaife, Gassen and LaFond 2006) . 37 In unreported results, I run the regressions described in Section 4.3 below using R 2 , instead of New R 2 . My estimates in this alternative regression are less precise, but qualitatively my results are similar to those described in Section 4.3. averaged over the study period ("buy-side retail trading") and 2) the ratio of the number of shares of a firm's stock sold by retail investors each trading day in the study period to the total number of a firm's shares traded each day in the study period, averaged over the study period ("sell-side retail trading").
I control for variables that may affect share price accuracy. I control for level of "INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP" (defined as the proportion of a firm's stock held by institutions as of March 31, 2005) 38 because there is reason to believe that firms with a largely institutional shareholder base may be more likely, in response to shareholder demand, to provide specific earnings guidance and make voluntary disclosures about their business prospects that can help the market more accurately establish prices for the firms' shares. My control variables also include "SIZE" (measured as a firm's average market capitalization (closing share price x number of shares outstanding) during the study period) and "VOLUME" (average daily volume of total shares traded in a firm's stock during the study period) because larger, more liquid firms are more likely to have a large investor following and generate more interest and, potentially, private information. I account for the effects of research analysts who disseminate firm-specific information into the marketplace with two variables: 1) the number of different analysts that cover the firm (as evidenced by the publication of earnings estimates) during the study period ("RESEARCH COVERAGE") and 2) the total number of earnings per share estimates released by analysts for a firm during the study period ("RESEARCH ACTIVITY"). Because controllers or other insiders may possess superior private information about a firm's prospects, but also, conversely, may make firms less transparent (see, for example, Pizarro et al. 2007 ), I control for the proportion of a firm's stock held by insiders (for example, directors and officers) ("INSIDER OWNERSHIP") and for the proportion of a firm's stock held by individuals or institutions with 5% or greater stock ownership in the 38 One should note that because the institutional ownership variable is based on Form 13-F data (all institutions with $100 million or more in securities under discretionary management are required to report their holdings to the SEC each quarter), the variable only represents stock owned by large institutions (that is, those with $100 million or more in assets under management) and does not account for shares held by small institutions. One also should note that because of duplicative reporting by institutions on the required Form 13-F's some firms in the study sample have institutional ownership percentage values that, as calculated, exceed 100% (Other researchers have found that such instances of duplicative reporting are generally rare (see, for example, Thakor, Nielsen and Gulley 2005) and, thus, the figures, though anomalous, should not bias this study's results significantly. In the instant study, 65 of the 1,129 stocks in the sample (5.8%) have institutional ownership percentages that, as calculated, exceed 100%).
company ("5% OWNER OWNERSHIP").
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Diversified conglomerates may be more difficult for investors to understand and value or may track the market more closely because they operate in more segments of the economy. I, therefore, control for firm-level diversity ("DIVERSITY"), measured by the number of four-digit SIC codes in which the firm operates.
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In addition, I control for firm news coverage ("NEWS COVERAGE") during the study period 41 because media attention affects the amount of firm-specific information in the marketplace. News coverage also may affect the trading behavior of retail investors, as Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual investors are attracted to stocks that capture their attention for a number of reasons, including by being featured in news stories.
I also employ a number of additional controls suggested by the work of Baker and Wurgler (2006) that are related to share price accuracy. Baker and Wurgler argue that stock mispricings result from "both an uninformed demand shock and a limit on arbitrage." Investor sentiment, they argue, may vary across firms and affect prices in the following manner. Using one possible definition of investor sentiment as the "propensity to speculate," Baker and Wurgler suggest that investor sentiment may drive 39 A more apt variable would be the proportion of trades represented by insiders or 5% holders, rather than ownership by such investors, but this trading information is not currently available in a comparable format to that of the retail trading data I use in this study. 40 In unreported results, I use, as an alternative, four dummy variables in my regression representing the fourcategories of diversification suggested by Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) . Under this formulation, I calculate a firm's level of "broad spectrum diversity (BSD)," measured as the number of two-digit SIC code industries in which a firm operates and a firm's level of "mean narrow spectrum diversity (MNSD)," defined as the number of four-digit SIC code industries in which a firm operates. Firms with BSD levels below the mean of my sample population are characterized as "low" BSD firms, and firms with BSD levels above the mean of my sample population are characterized as "high" BSD firms. Similarly, firms with MNSD levels below the mean of my sample population are characterized as "low" MNSD firms, and firms with MNSD levels above the mean of my sample population are characterized as "high" MNSD firms. Firms that have both low BSD and low MNSD are "Category 1" firms or those with "very low diversity." Firms that have both high BSD and high MNSD are "Category 4" firms or those with "very high diversity." Firms with low BSD, but high MNSD are "Category 2" firms or "related-diversified" firms. Firms with high BSD, but low MNSD are "Category 3" firms or "unrelated-diversified" firms. My results remain qualitatively unchanged when I employ these dummy variables instead of the one based simply on the number of four-digit SIC codes. 41 Consistent with prior studies, I calculate level of news coverage by hand counting the number of days during the study period on which a firm is featured prominently in a Dow Jones News Service story. "Featured prominently" means being mentioned by name either in the headline or lead paragraph. I use number of days of coverage, rather than the number of individual news stories, to avoid the possibility of counting multiple, essentially identical stories appearing in the Dow Jones News Service on the same day. Counting duplicate news stories could provide a distorted view of the amount of information disseminated to the public marketplace. Note, however, in a separate regression, I use the raw number of news stories over the study period as the "news coverage" independent variable. In unreported results, I find the outcome does not change qualitatively from the results in the original regression as reported in this Section 4.3.
the demand for speculative investments. They also argue that what makes a firm's stock particularly vulnerable to investors' propensity to speculate lies in large part in the subjectivity of the firm's valuation.
Firms that are young and unprofitable and that have extreme growth prospects allow unsophisticated investors to defend "with equal plausibility" a wide range of valuations that are consistent with the investors' general market sentiment (that is, either general pessimism or optimism). This form of speculation is more difficult to do with firms with a long, established earnings history, tangible assets and stable dividends.
Similarly, firms with characteristics that make arbitrage (to offset any noise trading or speculative tendencies) difficult are also more subject to mispricing. Drawing on prior research that shows that arbitrage is particularly costly and risky for stocks of young, small, unprofitable, extreme growth or distressed firms, Baker and Wurgler posit that such firms are more likely to be mispriced. 42 The stocks that are the hardest to value are also the most difficult to arbitrage.
I therefore adopt the following additional controls: "AGE" (firm age, measured, to the nearest month, as the number of months the firm has appeared in CRSP), "VOLATILITY" (stock volatility, measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over my 17-month study period), 43 two variables related to profitability --"RETURN ON EQUITY" 44 and a dummy variable for whether a firm is profitable (that is, has positive earnings), two variables related to dividend payments --"DIVIDENDS- 42 As Baker and Wurgler (2006, 1649-50 , citations omitted) explain, "First, [the stocks'] high idiosyncratic risk makes relative-value arbitrage especially risky. Moreover, such stocks tend to be more costly to trade and particularly expensive, sometimes impossible, to sell short. Further, their lower liquidity exposes would-be arbitrageurs to predatory attacks." 43 One could argue that a useful measure for comparison purposes would be relative standard deviation of returns, calculated as standard deviation divided by the mean, rather than the raw standard deviation as used by Baker and Wurgler. Relative standard deviation is used to compare the variability of data when the means of the data (here, firms' average stock returns) are significantly different across the sample. I run the regression analysis described in this Section 4.3 using both standard deviation and relative standard deviation and in unreported results find that though standard deviation is a significant variable in the regression, relative standard deviation is not. However, the relationship between retail trading (the variable of interest) and R 2 is qualitatively identical in both formulations. 44 Return on equity is defined as earnings/book equity. Earnings (E) is income before extraordinary items (Compustat Item 18) plus income statement deferred taxes (Compustat Item 50), minus preferred dividends (Compustat Item 19). Book equity (BE) is stockholders' equity (Compustat Item 60) plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat Item 35). All references to Compustat Item numbers in this note and the ones to follow, unless otherwise noted, are for the year 2004 (that is, the year immediately before the beginning of the study period).
TO-EQUITY"
45 and a dummy variable for whether a firm pays dividends (that is, has positive dividends per share), two variables related to asset tangibility --the ratio of "TANGIBLE ASSETS TO TOTAL Table 2 contains pairwise correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in this analysis.
After performing a regression analysis using firm-specific return variation (R 2 ) as the dependent variable, and all of the above explanatory variables, I run several types of regression diagnostics. A check of the normality of residuals and the existence of a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables reveals that a number of the independent variables are problematic. Thus, to correct for this deficiency where warranted, I express the values of certain variables in natural logarithms.
The variables requiring this treatment and for which I provide the requisite transformation 50 include buyside retail trading, sell-side retail trading, market capitalization, trading volume, research activity, insider 45 Dividends-to-equity is defined as dividends/book equity. Dividends are the dividends per share at the ex date (Compustat Item 26) times Compustat shares outstanding (Compustat Item 25) divided by book equity, as defined in note 44 above. 46 Tangible assets to total assets is defined as property, plant and equipment (Compustat Item 7) divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6). Research and development expenses to total assets is defined as R&D expense (Compustat Item 46) divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6). Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006) , missing values of R&D expense are set to zero. As a robustness check, I run the regression analysis described in this Section 4.3 first, including all firms in the sample and then, excluding firms with missing R&D values. In unreported results, I find that the outcomes are qualitatively identical. 47 Book to market equity is book equity (defined in note 44 above) divided by a firm's average market capitalization during the study period. In addition, the firms in the sample are divided into deciles by sales growth, with firms with the highest level of sales growth considered "extreme growth" firms. In addition, firms in the top three deciles are considered "high growth" firms, and firms in the bottom three deciles are considered "low growth firms." 50 The variables for return on equity, sales growth, and external finance show some evidence that they require this treatment, as well, but the conclusion is not clear. I, therefore, leave these variables in the regression in their unaltered state. I run a regression analysis using transformed variables for return on equity, sales growth and external finance, and my overall results remain qualitatively unchanged from those I report in this Section 4.3. I, however, lose almost 500 observations. I lose such a large portion of my sample following this transformation because a significant number of the firms in my sample have negative values for these variables, for which a logarithmic transformation is impossible.
ownership, dividends-to-equity, R&D-to-assets and age in months. 51 As a check against outliers and influential data points, 52 I winsorize all independent variables at their 0.5% and 99.5% values, as in Baker and Wurgler (2006) .
To address multicollinearity problems revealed by regression diagnostics, I performed principal component analysis. Principal component analysis derives alternative independent variables that a researcher may put into a regression equation by giving the pre-existing variables different weights and generating a "blended" explanatory variable that the researcher may use in the regression instead. In this analysis, I generated two new variables using this methodology: 1) "retail trading," which combines buyside retail trading and sell-side retail trading and 2) "size, volume and research," which combines market capitalization, trading volume, research coverage and research activity. In addition, my model excludes 1) the profitability dummy because it is highly correlated with return on equity, 2) the dividend payer dummy because it is highly correlated with dividends to equity and 3) all the sales growth dummies because they are highly correlated with the sales growth variable.
53
My regression takes the form:
2 i R where RETTRADE is the variable representing the proportion of trading by retail investors, I is institutional ownership, SIZEVOLRES represents a combined variable including size, trading volume, research coverage and research activity, INSOWN is insider ownership, 5PEROWN is five percent owner ownership, DIVERSE is a dummy variable that takes the value one for firms that operate in more than two 51 In addition, for the variables insider ownership, dividends-to-equity, and R&D-to-assets, I replace all zero values with a small constant (0.001) to allow the calculation of the natural log. However, with or without the addition of this constant, my results are qualitatively the same. 52 Through the regression diagnostics process, I learned that two of the firms in my sample consistently have values that are outliers. Performing the regression analysis without these two firms causes no qualitative changes in my results, as described in this Section 4.3. 53 I run one regression analysis using the new variables as described in this paragraph and another that includes each independent variable separately. In unreported results, I find that the results are qualitatively identical. industries, as indicated by four-digit SIC codes, NEWSDAYS is the number of days during the study period on which a firm is prominently featured in a news story, AGE is age, in months, STKVOL represents the volatility of a firm's stock, RETONEQ is return on equity, DIVTOEQ is dividends to equity, TANGASSETS is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, RDTOASSETS is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets, BKTOMKT is book-to-market equity, EXTFIN is level of external financing, and SALESG is sales growth. Table 3 reports the results of this regression, including t-statistics and robust standard errors, for the overall sample and shows that higher proportions of retail trading activity are positively associated with firm-specific return variation (that is, a lower R 2 ). This result is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01).
Because of the controversy with respect to the correct interpretation of R 2 , one must approach the above results with some caution. However, if a low R 2 is a sign of share price accuracy, then the results demonstrate that increased levels of retail trading are associated with more accurate share prices.
Industry Considerations
Some firms move more closely with the market because they are more sensitive to general economic conditions (see Durnev et al. [2003] for a general discussion of this point). Thus, it would not be fair to say that the stock prices of such firms are "less accurate" because market-wide factors largely drive their fundamentals (for example, earnings). To address this potential concern, in unreported results, I perform separate intra-industry regressions of the type described above using a sample of firms in industries that are particularly sensitive to macroeconomic factors (for example, construction companies, finance companies). My overall results still hold qualitatively. Although certain firms are more sensitive to market factors than others, my results reveal that, within groups of such "sensitive" firms, the level of retail trading has a statistically significant negative relationship with R 2 .
Size Effects
To assess whether firm size matters with respect to R 2 , I perform additional analyses. Firm size seems to be an important consideration in the analysis. However, recall the arguments of Lee and Liu (2007) and Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) with respect to R 2 . The larger firms relative to the smaller firms are more likely to operate in information-rich environments. Thus, consistent with the claims of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) , these firms, as a group, appear to have less firm-specific information impounded into their prices during the study period, likely because the market largely had anticipated firm-specific news from these firms.
I also find that retail trading in firms of different sizes is associated with R 2 in different ways. I perform separate regressions including first, only the largest firms in the sample (the "Top Half") and then only the smallest firms in the sample (the "Bottom Half").
The results in Table 3 reveal that higher levels of retail trading are associated with lower R 2 's in the overall sample and in the Top Half and Bottom Half size groups. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between retail trading activity and R 2 in the Top Half size group. This outcome demonstrates that the relationship between retail trading and R 2 is stronger for relatively smaller 54 firms.
Causation
Though the results described above demonstrate that retail investor trading is correlated with firm-specific return variation, I have not established that retail investor trading causes changes in firmspecific return variation. There may be no causal link or the causation may run in the opposite direction.
For example, individual investors may be attracted to firms with lower R 2 's, and the presence of such investors may have no effect on a stock's R 2 . Retail investors that are trying to "beat the market" may be more inclined to invest in stocks that have high firm-specific variation, or stockbrokers' recommendations to their individual investor clients also may tend to consist largely of stocks that have experienced recent movement due to idiosyncratic factors. Finally, firms with greater firm-specific information may garner more publicity and, thus, attract more retail investors. Consistent with that hypothesis, Barber and Odean (2008) provide evidence that individual investors are attracted to stocks that "catch the attention" of such investors through extreme price moves, abnormal trading volume and, as noted previously, news coverage. 55 Determining the existence and direction of causation is important for interpreting the results of this study.
There is no way to know with certainty whether retail trading causes changes in R 2 . But instrumental variable (IV) estimation is widely used by econometricians to determine the existence of causal relationships and address simultaneity concerns. In this study, through the two-stage least squares method of IV estimation, I, in the first stage, predict retail trading by using a factor (instrument) that is not directly related to R 2 . I then, in the second stage, use an IV estimator and the first stage "predicted" results to estimate the effect of retail trading on R 2 . "Stock price" is the instrument I use for retail trading.
"Stock price" is equal to a firm's average stock price during the study period. Like the independent variables used in the regressions in this study, average stock price in the IV estimation is winsorized at its 0.5% and 99.5% value.
To be a valid instrument, stock price must be correlated with (i) the proportion of retail trading in a stock (RETTRADE) and (ii) R 2 , but only indirectly through the proportion of retail trading (RETTRADE). The instrument also must be sufficiently strong (that is, have a high correlation with the independent variable of interest, RETTRADE). Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) suggest that individual investors may prefer stocks trading within certain price ranges because of cost concerns. One can imagine an individual investor of relatively modest means that prefers to purchase stock in round lots. 56 To this investor, a stock with a price of $9 may be significantly more attractive than one trading at 55 It should be noted that, as shown on Table 2 , there is not a positive correlation between the level of retail trading and news coverage. Level of a firm's media attention is, in part, a function of size (the correlation between news coverage and market capitalization is 0.58), and size is inversely correlated with the proportion of trading in a firm's stock by retail investors. However, in unreported regression results, I find strong evidence that as the level of news coverage increases, the level of retail trading increases, holding size constant. 56 The reason for a round lot preference likely is not rooted in concerns about transaction cost differentials. Angel (1997, 62) notes that the odd-lot differential (that is, higher execution costs for odd lot purchases and sales) has been eliminated and that some investors may pay a flat fee per trade, but states, "[n]evertheless, many investors are still $90 simply because the former is viewed as more affordable (at a total cost per round lot of $900 for the former and $9,000 for the latter). Similarly, if an investor desires diversification (assuming she relies on direct investment rather than investment through intermediaries such as mutual funds for this purpose) and has limited funds available for investment, she may have little choice other than to buy stocks with lower absolute prices to achieve her diversification goals (see Dhar et al. 2004 ). Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) employ the reciprocal of stock price as a control variable in a regression assessing the effect of advertising on stock ownership and find a statistically significant relationship (at the 1% level)
between stock price and the absolute number of total investors in a firm.
57
The results of the IV analysis in this study for the overall sample appear in Table 4 . Consistent with the findings and hypothesis of Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, the relationship between the proportion of retail trading and stock price is negative. The first stage results suggest that stock price is a strong instrument for retail trading (F-statistic = 47.81). In addition, the correlation between retail trading and stock price (-0.45) is strong.
In addition to statistical evidence suggesting that stock price is a strong instrument, qualitative reasons to believe the instrument is valid exist. The absolute level of stock price is only indirectly correlated with R 2 . Stock price level is unlikely to be directly correlated with R 2 because absolute stock price level should have no effect on share price accuracy or firm-specific return variation. Whether a stock trades at $9 or $90 is an irrelevant consideration with respect to how informative that price is or whether the stock's returns are correlated with the overall market or the firm's industry group. Absolute stock price is an arbitrary figure, devoid of informational content. Though the dependent variable in the main regressions in this study (R 2 ) is derived from a regression whose dependent variable is stock price reluctant to trade in odd lots." Similarly, Dhar et al. (2004, 19) , which examine trading behavior around stock splits, note that though the difference in costs for odd-lot trading and round-lot trading are insignificant during their sample study period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , "individual investors tend to like trading in hundreds of shares" and further state that approximately 82% of all common stock trades are round-lot trades. 57 Note, however, that they fail to find a statistically significant relationship between stock price and the absolute number of institutional investors in the firm.
returns, returns, which reflect relative stock price movements, are independent of absolute stock price levels.
The following simple example illustrates this point. Imagine two identical (with the exception of stock price) firms, each with a current market capitalization of $500 million. Firm A's stock price is $10 per share, and it has 50 million shares outstanding. Firm B, with 25 million shares outstanding, has a stock price of $20. If both Firm A and Firm B experience a negative profitability shock that changes the market's estimate of the firms' value from $500 million to $450 million, the stock prices of both firms will decline by 10% (Firm A's to $9 per share and Firm B's to $18 per share). Though the "pre-shock"
and "post-shock" prices are different for Firm A and Firm B, the percentage decline (the return) is the same. Prices and returns are independent, so stock price is likely a valid instrument.
One may argue that this conclusion is not free from doubt because there is some evidence that returns can be related to absolute stock price level. For example, Gaunt, Gray and McIvor (2003, 33) , in a study on Australian equity market returns, find that share prices, independent of firm size, affect portfolio returns. Similarly, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, 553 ) find a low price stock January effect (that is, the stocks earn abnormal returns in January). 58 Bhardwaj and Brooks characterize this result as a low price phenomenon because they, like Gaunt, Gray and McIvor, find that the return effects appear generally in stocks with low prices. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, 559) suggest that arguments used in the past to explain the anomalous returns of small firms (for example, illiquidity, inaccurate risk assessment, neglect, and transaction costs) can be applied with at least as much force to low price stocks. There is little reason to suspect that the low price phenomenon would affect the results of this study significantly, however.
This sample contains firms with relatively high share prices, as the median stock price is $32.89.
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58 Note that these abnormal returns disappear when factoring in transaction costs and bid-ask bias to returns in the 1977-1986 period. 59 Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, 556) use the following five groups to segment their sample by stock price: $5 or less, $5 -$10, $10 -$15, $15 -$20, and more than $20. Under this construction, stocks whose prices exceed $20 clearly are not low-priced. In addition, the median August 2006 (the final month of this study's analysis period) month-end stock price for the entire CRSP database is $17.09 (excluding firms with "$0" reported stock prices). Approximately 56.7% of these firms have stock prices below $20. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the stocks Therefore, the available evidence suggests that stock price is a valid instrument for retail trading in this context.
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The second stage regression demonstrates the effect retail trading has on R 2 . This regression shows how R 2 varies with conditions (higher or lower stock prices) that tend to be associated with lower or higher levels of retail trading. As shown in Table 4 , the coefficient for retail trading is negative; as the proportion of retail trading across firms in the sample increases, R 2 decreases. The retail trading coefficient in the instrumental variable estimation is statistically significant. The results of IV estimation analysis using the Top Half and Bottom Half size groups, also shown in Table 4 , are qualitatively identical to those for the overall sample.
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If the assumptions described in this sub-section are correct, the stock price could not cause a firm to have low or high R 2 ; stock price has no direct effect on R 2 . Thus, the results of this analysis provide evidence that the level of a firm's R 2 is caused at least in part by the effect of stock price on the level of retail trading and, in turn, by the effect of retail trading on R 2 . Though causality may run in both directions, through the use of this source of exogenous variation (the stock price, which causes one variable (retail trading) to change but not the other (R 2 )), I am able to determine the existence of one of the directions of causation and infer the nature and strength of the relationship between retail trading and R 2 . This analysis suggests that retail trading causes changes in firm-specific return variation.
Study Limitations
This study suffers from two limitations. First, it relies on a sample that includes only a subset of publicly traded firms -NYSE-listed companies only. The sample does not include the broader universe used in this study, with an overall median price of $32.89 and 865 firms (76.6% of the sample) with a price of more than $20 and only 28 firms (2.5%) with a stock price of under $5, are not, on the whole, low-priced stocks. 60 One could argue that low-stock price companies are inherently more volatile, which could result in lower R 2 's for such companies. Even if this were true, it would not affect the utility of stock price as an instrument. In this instance, just as described above, stock price still would be correlated with R 2 only indirectly, as it is not the price itself, but rather characteristics of firms with low prices that are correlated with volatility. In addition, just as discussed in note 59 above, few of the firms in this study's sample are low-priced stocks. 61 Unlike in the OLS regressions, here in the IV estimation, the retail trading coefficient is significant in the Top Half size group. The coefficients for all size groups also are significantly larger (on an absolute basis) in the second stage of the IV estimation than in OLS. This is likely due to the potential reverse causation problem identified in this section. However, just as in the OLS, the relationship between retail trading and R 2 is stronger in the Bottom Half size group than in the Top Half size group. of firms traded on other exchanges or markets. This is unavoidable given the lack, for non-NYSE companies, of direct (non-proxy), market-wide retail trading data of the sort used in this study. However, using this sample of NYSE firms allows one to test the relationship between R 2 and retail trading among firms that, relative to the broader market, operate in what could be termed a good information environment.
Second, the available data make it impossible to separate the trades of retail investors who are advised by a broker or other financial professional from the trades of individuals that make investment decisions independently. 62 The distinction is meaningful to the extent we hope to draw conclusions about the investment capacity of retail investors to inform securities regulation policy.
Discussion and Conclusion
This Article offers evidence that higher levels of trading by retail investors are associated with more firm-specific return variation (lower R 2 ). The relationship is stronger among the smaller firms in the sample than among the larger firms. This result is reasonable given the differences in retail trading in the larger and smaller firms. As shown in the summary statistics on Table 1 , though retail investors on average represent a small proportion of overall stock trading volume, they represent almost twice as much trading volume on a proportional basis for the relatively smaller firms as they do for the relatively larger firms. Thus, for the smaller firms, there is more opportunity for the trades of retail investors to have a meaningful impact on stock price movements.
This Article also provides some evidence that the relationship between retail trading and R 2 is causal. However, because of the controversy surrounding the correct interpretation of R 2 (that is, whether low R 2 is a sign of greater share price accuracy or greater informational inefficiency), the results of this study do not have clear policy implications. If the dominant view among R 2 adherents is correct (that is, lower R 2 's imply greater share price accuracy), then the findings of this study suggest that, contrary to the received wisdom, the presence of retail investors, as a group, in equity markets increases share price accuracy. Therefore, the instant study not only calls into question the need for policy changes to restrict 62 Note that some question the value of a broker's advice or her influence on an individual's trading decisions.
the access of retail traders, but also provides support for efforts to protect individual investors and increase their market participation. But if the predominant view is wrong, and a low R 2 is not a sign of share price accuracy, but rather a sign of the presence of greater noise in share prices, then the results of this study could lend support to the notion that individual investors are noise traders.
This study is not intended to, nor can it, resolve the controversy surrounding the correct interpretation of R 2 . However, it does yield insights that can contribute to the debate. As described in Section 3, Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) argue that the quality of information environment is important in interpreting R 2 . They assert that a firm in a high quality information environment is more likely to have a high R 2 during any defined study period because the firm's stock price before the beginning of the study period already reflects the anticipation of firm-specific news. There is less "surprise" and thus less price movement when firm-specific events occur during the study period. Extending the insights of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) , 63 two different types of information are relevant in this context: (1) the "base" of information generally available about a corporation and (2) the "flow" of information during a researcher's study period that affects the incorporation of firm-specific news.
The results 64 of the regressions performed in this study are instructive and reveal that firms that are larger and older, that have higher trading volume and more research coverage, that pay higher dividends relative to book equity, and that have a higher proportion of tangible assets tend to have higher R 2 's. All of these factors, as discussed previously in Section 4.3, are likely to contribute to a high quality information environment and make firms operating in this environment less likely to experience non- 63 Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) use the terms "time-variant" characteristics (that is, those factors reflecting the current state of the firm) and "time-invariant" characteristics (that is, those characteristics that do not change frequently or do not change much over time). One may think of "time-invariant" characteristics as related to the "base" of information or general information environment and "time-variant" characteristics as related to the "flow" of information. 64 Note that this section describes only those characteristics that have a statistically significant relationship with R 2 in the OLS regressions for the overall sample. Also, note that though sales growth is also a variable that is positively associated with R 2 , the meaning of this result is ambiguous. Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that sales growth can spur more speculation and hence may be associated with less accurate prices. However, sales growth is also a sign that a firm is not distressed, so arbitrage may be easier. This, in turn, leads to a likelihood of more accurate prices. market-related stock movements during the study.
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This study also reveals that firms with higher ownership by 5% holders, higher levels of R&D, and higher book-to-market ratios tend to have lower R 2 's. The presence of these characteristics, as discussed previously, is often associated with a poor quality information environment.
All of the traits mentioned in the prior paragraph bear a statistically significant relationship with R 2 , either positive or negative, and this is a result that appears to be consistent with the hypothesis of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) . Firms with characteristics that are consistent with a high quality information environment tend to have higher R 2 's. Conversely, firms with traits associated with low quality information environments tend to have lower R 2 's. These factors all relate to the "base" of information about a firm.
As Durnev et al. (2003) note, information about firm fundamentals is incorporated into stock prices in two ways: through a general revaluation of firm value following a public news release and through investor trading activity following the attainment of private information. 66 Therefore, this Article also provides evidence on the relationship between R 2 and two firm characteristics that relate to the "flow" of information into a firm's stock price: dissemination of firm-specific news and retail trading activity.
The results of this study reveal that higher numbers of news days are associated with lower R 2 .
Even firms in high quality information environments are not completely transparent; the market cannot anticipate fully all future firm-specific events. Therefore, the presence or absence of firm-specific news is important in explaining stock movements. News coverage reflects events affecting the firm during the study period, such as M&A activity, new customers, or new contract awards. Thus, finding that more 65 Recall the argument of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) . For firms in high quality information environments, as firm-specific events occur over a defined period of time (such as a limited study period), the stock prices of such firms will move principally with the overall market because investors already will have anticipated firm-specific events, and such expectations will be reflected in the pre-study period price. 66 Traders likely are more influential on the incorporation of fundamentals into stock prices than is the release of news items. Roll (1988) notes that individual firm-specific stock price movements generally are not correlated with an identifiable public dissemination of news. Thus, Roll argues, trading activity based on investor knowledge and beliefs informed by private information or, alternatively, due to noise, are likely more instrumental in stock price movements than public news releases.
firm-specific news is associated with a firm's stock returns tracking the broader market less closely is unsurprising. 67 News releases are a clear example of an item affecting the "flow" of information into stock prices.
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As noted above, retail trading levels also affect the "flow" of information in stock prices. A higher proportion of retail trading generally correlates with a greater number of individuals influencing asset prices. 69 This, of course, directly affects the flow of information into stock prices. This study demonstrates that, just as was the case with greater news coverage, higher levels of retail trading on a proportional basis are associated with lower R 2 .
Critics of the prevailing view regarding the correct interpretation of R 2 typically point to implausible correlations between firm characteristics such as small size or less research coverage, on one hand, and low R 2 , on the other, if low R 2 is indeed a sign of informational efficiency. The preceding analysis, building on the work of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) , takes a step toward explaining these apparent anomalies. Characteristics consistent with high quality information environments (the "base")
are associated with high R 2 's and characteristics consistent with increased information flow are associated with low R 2 's. The above analysis does not prove that low R 2 is a sign of share price informedness, but the evidence on the relationship between an information flow characteristic such as news coverage and R 2 suggests that one cannot rule that interpretation out as a possibility. Nor can one reject the possibility that trading by retail investors (also associated with low R 2 ) increases share price accuracy.
Though inconsistent with the conventional wisdom, one could construct a plausible account of how the presence of a greater proportion of individual investors increases share price accuracy. Even if individual investors occasionally or even frequently trade based on noise, they still have information that 67 Of course, if Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) are correct, then the firms whose stock prices will move the most in reaction to news releases are firms operating in relatively low quality (less transparent) information environments. 68 Though news coverage is primarily a "flow" of information characteristic as it relates to firm-specific events, it is true that some companies (for example, large firms, firms in popular industries) are more apt, holding all else equal, to attract media attention. 69 Because retail investors generally buy and sell smaller numbers of shares than institutions, for any given level of trading volume, a higher proportion of retail traders in a stock translates into more separate individuals making a judgment on stock price valuation. Black 1986 ). Thus, noise trading makes markets more liquid as informed traders attempt to exploit inefficiencies in markets caused by noise trading (Black 1986 ). 71 Noise trading also indirectly aids in price accuracy, as noise traders make it worthwhile for informed traders to acquire and trade on information that ultimately will make share prices more reflective of fundamental value (La Blanc and Rachlinski 2005) .
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70 This is especially true with respect to small firm stocks, for which liquidity often is a significant problem. 71 On the other hand, limits to arbitrage may make informed traders less willing to trade in the face of large amounts of noise trading (De Long et al. 1990, 703 ) ("The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them."). 72 Unfortunately, the way noise traders make this worthwhile for informed traders is by suffering losses in trades against informed traders (LaBlanc and Rachlinski (2005) NOTE.-The table above reports pairwise correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in the analysis of the relationship between R 2 and retail trading for the overall sample. The numbers in parentheses signify the probability levels at which one may reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation in two-tailed tests. + , *, and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
